Labor, Democrats and the Third Way by Friedman, Ellen David
Labor Research Review 
Volume 1 | Number 22 
Labor and Political Action Article 9 
1994 
Labor, Democrats and the Third Way 
Ellen David Friedman 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Labor Research Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please 
contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
© 1994 by Labor Research Review 
Labor, Democrats and the Third Way 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] This past winter the Massachusetts AFL-CIO made a striking gesture. Still smarting from the 
battle over the North American Free Trade Agreement, the state federation decided to withhold routine 
PAC contributions from Congressional members who had voted for NAFTA. The decision stood in stark 
contrast to the many decades in which organized labor offered fairly unconditional, uncritical support to 
the Democratic Party and its candidates, even when Democrats failed to behave as allies. And while the 
Massachusetts example is singular and perhaps not an example of broader currents, it should be seen in 
light of other phenomena: the dissolution of rank-and-file unionists as a predictable Democratic voting 
block; the assertive distancing by the Democratic Party from its traditional constituencies (for example, 
acceding to the popular image that minorities, women, and workers are "special interests"); the 
emergence of H. Ross Perot and his surprising appeal to some sectors of unionized voters; and the 
growing interest among local labor leadership in Labor Party Advocates, a pre-labor party organization. 
This is a moment in which old certainties about organized labor and the Democrats are becoming less 
certain; it is a circumstance that progressives within the labor movement should welcome and work with. 
Keywords 
AFL-CIO, Democratic Party, NAFTA, organized labor, campaign finance 
This article is available in Labor Research Review: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/lrr/vol1/iss22/9 

L A B O R R E S E A R C H R E V I E W # 2 2 
Labor, Democrats 
and the 
Third Way 
• Ellen David Friedman 
This past winter the Massachusetts AFL-CIO made a striking gesture. 
Still smarting from the battle over the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the state federation decided to withhold routine PAC con-
tributions from Congressional members who had voted for NAFTA. 
The decision stood in stark contrast to the many decades in which orga-
nized labor offered fairly unconditional, uncritical support to the Demo-
cratic Party and its candidates, even when Democrats failed to behave 
as allies. And while the Massachusetts example is singular and perhaps 
not an example of broader currents, it should be seen in light of other 
phenomena: the dissolution of rank-and-file unionists as a predictable 
Democratic voting block; the assertive distancing by the Democratic 
Party from its traditional constituencies (for example, acceding to the 
popular image that minorities, women, and workers are "special inter-
ests"); the emergence of H. Ross Perot and his surprising appeal to some 
sectors of unionized voters; and the growing interest among local labor 
leadership in Labor Party Advocates, a pre-labor party organization. 
This is a moment in which old certainties about organized labor and 
the Democrats are becoming less certain; it is a circumstance that 
progressives within the labor movement should welcome and work with. 
• Ellen David Friedman is an organizer with the Vermont National Education 
Association. 
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The possibilities for shaping a different relationship between the two 
seem to be increasing—whether the goal is to compel the Democratic 
Party towards greater respect for labor's agenda, or to build a new party 
founded on labor's agenda. Starting from a premise that labor's posi-
tion in U.S. electoral politics ought to be stronger, we can approach 
this discussion as we would other strategic questions: What are the cur-
rent realities in which organized labor operates? What is there to learn 
from experiments already under way? What resources does organized labor 
possess? What are the options for action and the obstacles to success? 
Finally, can we envision a future in which those inherently progressive 
goals of organized labor—economic security for workers and their fami-
lies, workplaces that are safe both for employees and their communities, 
elimination of discrimination on and off the job, protection of free 
speech and the rights of concerted action—can define the reality and 
not just the rhetoric of a major political party? 
We begin by looking at Vermont, a state in which the labor move-
ment has actively supported the only independent socialist to serve as 
a member of Congress in 40 years—Representative Bernie Sanders— 
and has involved itself in the progressive organization surrounding 
Sanders, the Vermont Progressive Coalition. Though not a state with 
a strong or broad labor presence, unions have significantly boosted this 
third party movement over the last 15 years. 
When Bernie Sanders was elected to his first surprising term of office 
as Burlington's mayor in 1981, it was widely understood that an endorse-
ment from the local policeman's union was crucial. At the time, the 
media were presenting Sanders as a wild-eyed radical. He had run a 
half-dozen earlier campaigns for high office on a third-party line (the 
Liberty Union Party, built by anti-war activists of the 1960s who had 
relocated to Vermont from the urban Northeast), never polling beyond 
single digits. His campaigns were considered symbolic, designed to raise 
issues rather than get him elected. And besides, he didn't comb his hair 
or wear a tie. So the police union's unexpected endorsement conferred 
sudden and powerful credibility to the campaign that catapulted Sanders 
into last-minute momentum and a 10-vote victory on election day. 
NEW CITY POLITICS 
From the union's point of view, as well, this was a valuable step to 
have taken. The pivotal nature of its endorsement was publicly under-
stood, which enhanced the union's standing as a political player. Plus, 
it had just helped place a pro-labor candidate in office—in essence, 
hiring its own friendly employer. Sanders' election began a period of muni-
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cipal labor relations in Burlington unprecedented for its respectful tone, 
innovation, and good contracts. 
The election made other major differences in the political life of the 
city. With Bernie Sanders in the mayor's office, newly appointed pro-
gressive activists on the city staff, and an energetic clutch of Progressive 
City Council members, Burlington city politics became a tripartite 
battleground whose chief antagonists were the Democrats and Pro-
gressives, with Republicans on the political fringes. 
Sharp neighborhood, class, and cultural antagonisms shot up between 
Democrats and Progressives. The hidden antagonism between these 
two factions, so often shackled unhappily together, burst into the open. 
Suddenly there was life and meaning in municipal political life. Public 
issues—their content, public discussion, and resolution—were infused 
with substance. People took sides. Voter turnout increased year by year, 
consistently exceeding national averages. The existence of a third party 
in Burlington was an antidote to political malaise. 
Over the next 13 years Sanders ran for higher office. When he gave 
up the mayor's seat in Burlington, he was succeeded by another 
Progressive. Progressives were elected every year to the Burlington City 
Council and then to the state legislature. The movement building 
around these elections was decidedly leftist, but it was always reaching 
into other constituencies: working with Vermont's farmers on the issue 
of dairy price supports and bovine growth hormone; assisting tenants 
in mobile home park buy-outs; brokering creative deals for affordable 
housing and grass-roots community economic development; support-
ing anti-discrimination measures for gays and lesbians; working with South 
Africa and Central America solidarity groups; and building ties to orga-
nized labor. The election cycle itself offered the unifying thread: If a 
given constituency saw the Progressives working effectively on their 
issue, they could be drawn into a Progressive election campaign. It 
worked well, but not flawlessly. 
In 1986, Bemie Sanders ran for governor with three mayoral terms behind 
him and a record of pro-labor activism unmatched by any elected offi-
cial. His opponent was the Democratic incumbent who had never 
demonstrated particular advocacy for labor or its issues. Nevertheless, 
the incumbent got all the labor endorsements—including those from 
unions that had loyally supported Sanders in his mayoral bids. The 
difference was scale. In local city elections, individual unions endorsed 
Sanders because he was so clearly their strong advocate. But in a state 
election, the Vermont State AFL-CIO chose the incumbent because she 
was more likely to be re-elected. Clearly, the higher the office, the more 
the power of incumbency dominates over political content. The refusal 
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of organized labor to rally to Sanders' side dealt a blow that the campaign 
could not overcome, and the election results were disappointing. 
But in 1988, with Sanders running for an open seat in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, the labor community again occupied a pivotal role 
and things began to shift. This election was a three-way race: a rich-boy 
Republican; a labor Democrat with the bona fides of several effective 
years of state legislative leadership; and Sanders. Organized labor locked 
onto the Democrat and, more or less, ran his campaign. Sanders was 
shunned by labor officialdom (such as it is in Vermont), but he grabbed 
the attention of the rank and file and stamped a defiant character on 
the campaign. The Republican limped to a victory only 3 percentage 
points in front of Sanders, whose showing stunned the state, while the 
labor Democrat ran far behind and retired from politics. 
By 1990 the seismic political shift had moved the thinking of orga-
nized labor. Sanders announced again for Congress, and the unions, one 
by one, lined up behind him. Their earlier caution had succumbed to 
the tug of their own members. Bernie had gone directly to workers with 
his straightforward appeal, and the leadership was smart enough to 
follow. Now the trepidation shifted to the halls of international unions 
in Washington, as calculations were made about the cost of endorsing 
an independent candidate. The local AFL-CIO unions in Vermont 
waited until September and then made a single, joint endorsement of 
Sanders. Although the national AFL-CIO COPE committee's decision 
to concur was made easier by the presence of a wholly noncredible can-
didate on the Democratic line, its action provoked tremors of disapproval 
from both the state Democratic Party and the Democratic National 
Committee (two years later, when the Teamsters made a $10,000 contri-
bution to the Progressive Coalition to support its legislative candidates, 
the Democratic governor publicly reprimanded the union). But the 
dynamism of of the 1990 race was palpable: unionists participated at 
unprecedented levels, and Sanders' 17-point victory over the Republi-
can incumbent again demonstrated the centrality of labor's role. 
The two major parties in Vermont have accomodated Bernie Sanders 
as an individual politician, who, with his unusual individual draw and 
power for the electorate, has enjoyed increasingly strong election 
victories. In 1992 and 1994, for example, the Democrats again opted 
not to field a serious congressional candidate against him. But this 
should not be confused with acceptance of a third party. In fact, like 
municipal politics in Burlington, the terrain of state legislative politics 
is contested. Unions, along with many other constituent and advocacy 
organizations, can find themselves caught in the complicated cross-
currents generated by a third party. 
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Consider the still-unfolding story of an attempt by Vermont's Demo-
cratic leadership to bust the state's largest union. The Vermont affiliate 
of the National Education Association (NEA) represents nearly all of 
the state's 8,000 teachers, in 200 locals, under a collective-bargaining 
law that's been on the books for about 25 years. It is a small-d, and in 
general also capital-D, democratic union, which is aggressive, hard-
working, and successful. It behaves like a union, often defying the wistful 
hope for professional gentility that the public holds out for teachers. 
But despite its long and successful tenure, Vermont-NEA has just 
suffered a startling setback. In January, the Vermont House of Repre-
sentatives voted through a bill dismantling the collective bargaining 
law for teachers. The bill, if it had passed the Senate and become law, 
would have unilaterally eliminated all bargaining over wages and ben-
efits by local unions and instead placed teachers under a single contract 
with the state. Thus, teachers would no longer bargain with their actual 
employers, a foundational principle of U.S. labor law. Teachers would 
also lose the right to strike. Local school boards, while no longer set-
ting wages and benefits, could unilaterally impose working conditions 
which had been subject to union negotiation for 25 years. 
The bill's Democratic sponsors insisted initially that the union would 
be strengthened by uniting all the state's teachers under one contract. 
But their rhetoric a year later revealed their actual motive: this pro-
posal, they now say, is really needed to control education costs, a feat 
more easily accomplished when the legal framework that gives teach-
ers bargaining rights is abolished. In sum, a great setback to a large and 
well-organized sector of public employees. 
What makes this situation startling is that it occurred in a House 
with a significant Democratic majority. It is a House with a Democratic 
speaker who is a teacher and a member of the union. It is a legislature 
that serves a Democratic governor, who was revered in his earlier poli-
tical days as a friend of public education. 
By way of partial explanation, Democrats were given a righteous ratio-
nale to vote for the new legislation, even if it meant alienating union 
members. The union-busting measure was linked to a highly progres-
sive plan for property tax reform, ironically, one the union had enthu-
siastically supported for a long time. The liberal Democrats whose votes 
were needed were convinced that they were serving a greater good. They 
were told that it was really not union-busting to revoke the law. In the 
absence of a strong labor culture, they were too easily persuaded that 
a different kind of "decisionmaking" between teachers and their employ-
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ers could happily replace collective bargaining. For some, there was the 
useful subtext that a statewide contract would surely lead to lower 
teacher salaries, and therefore greater state control over education costs. 
These Democrats were, in short, offered an attractive bribe to stab orga-
nized labor in the back—and they all took it. 
These are not enemies in a conventional sense. Far from it. The 
Democrats who voted with one stroke to bust hundreds of local unions 
are, by and large, liberal. As a group they generally act to support and 
enlarge the role of the state as a redistributor of social wealth. They 
raise taxes to put more money into schools, environmental protection, 
and housing. They have passed enlightened civil rights protections for 
gays and people with disabilities. But even in these liberal circles, labor 
is not part of the liberal definition. Rather, labor is viewed as a pic-
turesque relic, both unfashionable and out of date. 
Democrats, almost to a person, voted for the tax reform proposal, despite 
the bill's union-busting provisions. Virtually all Republicans voted 
against it—not for labor solidarity, to be sure, but to defeat the tax 
reform measures, which they considered far too progressive. Only 
Vermont's three independent Progressive Representatives voted, delib-
erately and vocally, with the union. 
For many of Vermont's teachers, the behavior of the Democrats felt 
like a personal betrayal. They were forced to confront an astounding con-
clusion: "It's the Democrats who are union-busting! The same legislators 
who we endorsed, campaigned for, gave money to and voted for. The 
same ones who've always supported schools and teachers." And follow-
ing the sturdy political adage that friends are to be rewarded and enemies 
punished, teachers who have been lifelong Democrats are bitterly turning 
away from the party and its officeholders. 
In every other state in this country, Democratic officeholders could 
safely walk away from an issue like this, believing that, in then end, they 
would not lose these union voters to Republicans. They would reason, 
with justification, that a disgruntled union constituent would be crazy 
to try and unseat a Democrat. Ultimately, they would feel safe to take 
for granted those large constituencies—women, minorities, workers— 
who simply had no better place to go. In Vermont however, because of 
the existence of a pro-labor third party, there might well be a better place 
for unionized voters to go. 
In the present instance, Vermont NEA leadership used a variety of 
public opportunities to show their appreciation of the stand taken by 
Progressive legislators, and by doing so defiantly placed the Democrats 
on notice not to take them for granted. But this was unchartered terrain. 
Clearly, there were risks to breaking off the historic ties. The powerful 
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Democratic Speaker of the House became arrogant and threatening. Demo-
cratic legislators regularly warned the union that the Progressives lacked 
credibility, and that any continuing alliance with the Progressives would 
further undermine the union's cause. The union and the Democrats 
are in an unprecedented war, provoked largely because the union decided 
not to sit quietly by and take the abuse the party served up. They had 
another political choice and they exercised it, but the union still faces 
real consequences because every facet of public education policy, school 
funding and public employee labor law is made by this legislature. Politi-
cians will face their consequences when the union decides who to endose 
and who to support financially. 
But leaving aside for a moment the unique conditions in Vermont, 
it is possible in this example to see the outlines of the problem faced 
by the labor movement nationally. The labor movement reaches its 
highest points of mobilization when faced with decisive enemies. Dur-
ing the Reagan-Bush years workers' rights were clearly under assault. 
Democrats have been able to take organized labor for granted because 
the party's candidates have always been the lesser of two electoral evils. 
The result has often been confusion and demoralization within labor 
circles, brought to a head by a set of crises with the Clinton Adminis-
tration. What does organized labor do when its enemies are liberals? 
What are the rules for fighting a politician who behaves sometimes like 
a traditional "social contract" Democrat (championing the Family Leave 
Act), and sometimes like a financier (trading bribes for NAFTA votes) ? 
What are labor's leaders to think and do with a liberal President who 
finally decides that his marketability rests on being able to strike a blow 
against workers of three nations and all colors? What lesson do we draw 
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for rank-and-file union members in the NAFTA vote—a vote in which 
Democrats, shame-faced or not, did more to suppress the social wage, 
blunt the effectiveness of organized labor, and secure the bounty of super-
profits for multinationals than in any other political act in recent memory? 
APPLYING THE LESSONS 
One lesson—a cheap, dead-end, and no-gain one—is cynicism. It 
might be satisfying to join that current of hard cynicism that eddies through 
the ranks of American workers faster all the time. And it is the one polit-
ical lesson that comes readily after a typical encounter with elected 
liberals. We're diminished and dismissed, taken, and taken for granted. 
Why not savor this well-earned cynicism and really walk out of politics 
in a serious way. Take our money. Stop collecting PAC contributions 
and giving big checks to every municipal, county, state, and national 
Democratic Committee that sends us a fund-raising reminder. Stop 
organizing the requisite phone banks every other October. Just wish the 
conservatives and liberals a pox on both their houses and turn our backs. 
We could certainly take that path. Our ranks are halfway there on 
their own. In the union I work for—a union of professionals who are 
public employees to boot, whose members are thoughtful, altruistic, civic-
minded, and activist—we have routinely had to shore up the rationale 
for candidate endorsement, campaign shoe leather, and lobbying. 
Many rank-and-file members chafe at their union's involvement in 
politics. They are cynical: about the candidates themselves, the motives 
of a politicized union, and the process of endorsement; about any author-
ity that will attempt to "tell them how to vote" and about the concept of 
ideological homogeneity within a union membership. They are cynical 
about the efficacy of an endorsement, should one bother to make one, 
and cynical that even a successful endorsement will lead to something 
better in their lives, their paychecks, or their workplaces. In fact, union 
members—like an increasing number of Americans—are deeply cynical 
about the whole project of politics. They vote, but find nearly every-
thing else worthy of suspicion. 
There certainly could be a temptation for labor's political organizers 
and leaders to embrace the political cynicism they see among their 
members. But organizers understand that the appeal of cynicism is a 
dangerous seduction because it deeply undermines organizational cohe-
sion and encourages passivity. Cynicism creates an ambience of second-
guessing, dismissal, inaction, and resistance and can diminish the stature 
of leaders and paralyze a membership. Labor's leaders cannot afford to 
encourage political cynicism. 
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Yet political optimism about either of the major political parties is 
pretty thin, at best. The major issues of concern to workers both union-
ized and unorganized aren't effectively addressed by the Democrats or 
Republicans: a national economic strategy; reindustrialization; dealing 
with structural unemployment; overhauling the labor law; establishing 
workplace equity for women and minorities; and providing adequate day 
care and health care for workers and their families. Not to mention the 
affirmative damage done to American workers by NAFTA—conceived 
by Republicans but delivered by Democrats. 
Even in the face of real betrayal, giving up on the Democrats is not 
so easy for many laborites. Ask many of us, "Should labor have hope 
about the Democrats?" and we're likely to respond with pangs of loy-
alty, feelings of nostalgia, and a hope that Democrats will return to "tra-
ditional Democratic" labor values. We want to believe that Democrats 
are our allies because of history and because the present might seem 
bleak and friendless without them. But a more objective assessment, 
rooted in recent facts, would lead us to a different conclusion. Labor 
may be right in allying with the Democratic Party given the choices at 
hand, but we should not delude ourselves that the Democrats consti-
tute a goodchoice for us. We are left then looking for a strategy that is 
neither cynical (and therefore ultimately self-isolating) nor naive (and 
therefore perpetually disappointing). 
In this light, a strategy of independent politics is worth a long look. 
The first phase of such a process would be evidence of the weakening 
bond between labor and the mainstream of the Democratic Party. In 
1984 and 1988, the pull of Rev. Jesse Jackson's presidential campaigns 
on rank-and-file union members and an important cross-section of their 
leaders, was apparent. While these campaigns were conducted within 
the Democratic Party, they were sparked by defiance against the party 
and always existed on its fringe. In 1992, labor's leaders chose various 
Democrats during the primaries and then dutifully closed powerful 
ranks behind Clinton, but have been in public discord with him ever 
since over health care, NAFTA, labor law reform, and welfare. Inde-
pendent H. Ross Perot did not galvanize many formal labor endorse-
ments, but he pulled votes from unionized workers equally frightened 
by recession, NAFTA, and the deficit. 
The next ascending step on this path is actual labor involvement in 
independent campaigns, or in consideration of third-party efforts. We 
have already examined the support of unions, both within and outside 
of Vermont, for Bernie Sanders. Other unions are actively attempting 
to build independent electoral activity in other parts of the country. 
Leaders such as Jan Pierce of the Communication Worker of America 
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and Ron Carey of the Teamsters have been open and vigorous on this 
subject. The OCAW's Tony Mazzocchi has, for many years, pushed 
for the creation of a labor party; a growing Labor Party Advocates mem-
bership and plans for a founding convention are signs these efforts are 
bearing fruit. There is labor interest in the New Party, whose strategy 
of supporting progressive third-party candidates, primarily in municipal 
and county elections, is showing strong early results. 
These are disparate fragments, to be sure, and they aren't part of any 
considered, overall strategy—but they do share something: a vitality 
and integrity that is painfully absent in most conventional politics. The 
electoral efforts, particularly the lower-level campaigns that are part of 
a party-building effort, certainly escape the pull towards cynicism. In 
fact, they can only rise on a tide of hope and risk-taking, and in this way 
reflect what is best about the labor movement itself. And they also 
attempt to solve the endemic problem in labor's relation to the Demo-
crats: that is, choosing the lesser of two evils. Candidates, or parties, 
who stand up in a robust way for a consistent value-based politics can 
engender great activism among their followers. And an energized con-
stituency does not want to settle for anyone—they fight like mad for 
what they really want. 
The labor movement brings unique resources to the daunting pro-
ject of building an independent labor party: unionists know how to pick 
winning fights, time our victories, recruit and train promising leaders, 
build sturdy units of members who are accountable to one another, and 
keep our sights fixed on concrete goals. We have had decades of experi-
ence in running our own organizations, experimenting with democratic 
self-governance, and learning how to make sound decisions in the interest 
of the majority. We have had to raise our operating budgets from mem-
bership dues—not private grants, corporate sponsorship, or government 
subsidy—which we get to collect only as long as we keep serving our 
members' interests. We have been kicked in the press, tested by hostile 
politicians, weathered by strikes and endless disputes. Some of our 
unions have faced the hard test of rooting out corruption and cronyism. 
The resources that we bring are unique, because the opportunities and 
challenges of unionism are unique, keeping us both grounded in reality 
and held aloft by high principle. Organized labor is well equipped to 
build itself a political party. 
The impediments to this strategy, however, should be given serious 
weight in any discussion. The preeminent strength of the two-party 
system in the U.S. is a fundamental fact. The numerous structures that 
keep this system in place—from restrictive state and federal election 
laws to bi-partisan corporate PACs and a complicit and compliant 
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media—are each hugely powerful institutional forces. 
The American political system itself is glued together by a sturdy 
national ideology that abhors basic political division, an ideology most 
pointedly manifested as anti-communism during this century, but pre-
sent to different degrees in the politics of racism, homophobia, and 
misogyny. A key to the effectiveness of this ideology is that it seeks to 
marginalize its opponents and cut them away from the political life of 
the population. This obviously poses a danger for insurgent social move-
ments of any kind, but particularly so for an electoral movement, which 
depends on access to the broader population for its continued exis-
tence. Therefore, achieving enough credibility to withstand political 
marginalization becomes key to building a progressive third party. Such 
a party must surpass charges of spoilerism, irrelevance, and ineffec-
tiveness while it is on its way to maturity. But the labor movement itself 
had to face this challenge on the way to its own maturity. 
Keeping mindful of the fact that a strategy must always be driven by 
its final goals, it is useful to take another page from the book of labor 
history when envisioning the possible accomplishment of a progressive 
labor party. Namely, it seems that labor should not be preparing itself 
to build the successor to the Democratic Party, but rather creating a 
firm institutional place within the electoral arena from which to advo-
cate its collective self-interest. Organized labor has not sought to become 
management, but to contend with management over economic and 
workplace rights. Similarly, an independent labor party cannot be the 
majority governing party in the foreseeable future in a society so thor-
oughly dominated by capital. But it can secure for itself a reserved spot 
in U.S. political life and act as a powerful focal point in debates critical 
to its interests. In the debate over welfare reform, for example, a labor 
party would be forcing the issue of structural unemployment to the 
fore and thus restrain the tendency towards the victim-blaming that charac-
terizes the current discourse. The identifiable interest of labor in most 
public issues would become a permanent thorn in the sides of Demo-
crat and Republican leaders when even a very small number of elected 
labor progressives begin operating with the impunity of a third party. 
Our unions' members and the millions of unorganized American 
workers, who are victimized by politics-as-usual, need the vitality and 
dynamism of a political movement that is founded on progressive labor 
values. They can't afford the fruits of cynicism or passivity. The experi-
ence and resources to mobilize and build a labor party are in our hands. 
It's time. • 
